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Abstract 
 
This study focuses on S&P500 inclusions and deletions, examining the impact of potential 
overnight price adjustment after the announcement of an S&P500 index change.  We find 
evidence of a significant overnight price change that diminishes the returns available to 
speculators although there are still profits available from the first day after announcement until a 
few days after the actual event. More importantly, observing the tick-by-tick stock price 
performance and volume effects on the key days during the event window for the first time, we 
find evidence of consistent trading patterns during trading hours. A separate analysis of 
NASDAQ and NYSE listed stocks allows for a detailed examination of the price and volume 
effect at an intra-day level. We find that index funds appear to cluster their rebalancing activities 
near to and after the close on the event date, suggesting that they are more concerned with 
tracking error than profit. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last 20 years, index funds have become extremely popular, with total worldwide 
explicitly indexed assets estimated to exceed $1 trillion. When “trackers” follow a benchmark 
index, their investment decisions are not based on fundamental analysis. Instead, they make the 
necessary portfolio adjustments only to reduce tracking error, which ensures that such funds will 
prefer index member stocks to non-members. Thus the deletion of an existing member-firm from 
a widely followed benchmark has a significant implication for fund managers. For pure index 
trackers, the only reason, apart from changing cash flows, for trading stocks will be index 
composition reviews. 
 
The “index effect” refers to the price pressure that is observed when a stock is added to or deleted 
from an index. If the index is widely tracked, then profits can be made by buying (selling) the 
shares of the added (deleted) firm ahead of index funds and selling (buying) them at a later stage, 
when index fund demand (supply) is satisfied. The more money is tied to the index, the more 
index portfolio managers will be involved in trading the underlying stocks around index 
recomposition. Index trackers ensure that demand will increase for added stocks and will reduce 
for deleted stocks. For many years, “buying additions and selling deletions” has been a lucrative 
strategy for investors not involved in index tracking.
1
 
 
This study examines the impact of potential overnight price adjustment after the announcement of 
an S&P500 index addition as well as the impact on the prices and volumes of the stocks on a tick-
                                                 
1
 Academic research has supported this statement for more than 20 years. The abnormal return reported between 
announcement and event of an index change has ranged between 3%-8% depending on the time period studied 
(Harris and Gurel, 1986; Beneish and Whaley, 1996; Malkiel and Radisich, 2001; Chen, Noronha and Singal, 2004). 
Standard and Poor’s analysts have also reported evidence of significant abnormal returns during periods of 
recomposition of the main indices (S&P 500, S&P MidCap400 and S&P SmallCap 600) – see Bos (2000). 
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by-tick basis. A separate analysis is conducted for additions and deletions and also for NASDAQ 
listed versus NYSE listed stocks. Previous studies have mainly concentrated on close-to-close 
abnormal returns and showed that there is a significant price increase between the close on the 
announcement day and the close on the day after. However, the purchase of the added stock 
cannot be made at the close of trading on the announcement day because the information is 
released to the market after the close. The first trading opportunity arises in the morning of the 
first day after announcement, when the stock usually opens at a considerable price increase, 
resulting in lower actual trading profits; our study investigates this issue in detail. 
 
The following analysis differs from previous studies in four important areas. First, the results 
involve not only close-to-close abnormal returns but also overnight and open-to-close returns. 
Second, the tick-by-tick stock price performances and trading volumes of the added stocks are 
examined for the first time for the years 1999 and 2000. This analysis enables us to provide a 
more detailed picture of the objectives and actions of index fund managers and arbitrageurs. 
Third, NYSE and NASDAQ samples are examined separately to determine the impact of trading 
venue on the index effect.
2
 Finally, we make use of a more recent and longer run of data on index 
additions than was available in previous studies. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief description of 
the major stock selection criteria and the announcement policies of the Standard and Poor’s Index 
Committee. Section three presents a brief summary of previous relevant studies associated with 
S&P500 index changes and the prevailing hypotheses that lie behind the companies’ post-event 
                                                 
2
 This separation may be particularly important where trading volumes are concerned since there is evidence that 
volumes are considerably over-estimated on the NASDAQ, although in a complex way, so that a simple adjustment 
for comparability is not possible – see Anderson and Dyl (2005).  
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performance. Section four examines the stock performance after addition by using overnight and 
open-to close data and section five provides results using tick-by-tick abnormal returns. Section 
six presents an analysis of the index effect at the intra-day level and section seven examines the 
intra-day index affect of a deletions sample. Section eight concludes. 
 
2. Index tracking and the S&P500 
The S&P500 is a value-weighted index that reflects the market value of all 500 component US 
stocks relative to a particular base period. The selection and management of the index is 
determined by the Standard and Poor’s Index Committee. Changes in index composition are 
mainly caused by member companies effectively ceasing to exist in their current form through 
mergers, takeovers, restructuring or bankruptcies. According to a statement by Standard and 
Poor’s, candidate firms are “monitored carefully and the criteria for inclusion are highly 
stringent”. After screening candidate companies, an S&P500 Replacement Pool is created that 
contains at least 10 companies. The prevailing company from this Pool is chosen whenever a new 
entry to the index is required following the deletion of another company. The selection process 
for S&P500 membership does not simply refer to a typical quantitative ranking system based on 
market capitalisation. Therefore, it is difficult for institutional investors and fund managers to 
anticipate the changes. This is in contrast with the procedures that operate for most other major 
indices. In general, but not exclusively, S&P member companies have the largest market value in 
their sector and are chosen to represent their industry in the US market. The selection process 
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entails an examination of the firm’s trading activity, such as public float3 and turnover ratios, to 
ensure high liquidity and to reduce the probability of deviations from the “fair” stock price.  
 
Standard and Poor’s changed their announcement policy twice – in September 1976 and more 
recently in October 1989. The latter change was made in order to alleviate the price pressure on 
the announcement date that occurred prior to this when index inclusion took place immediately 
the day after announcement. Changes are now pre-announced an average of five days before the 
event. The period from the announcement date to the effective date offers time for institutional 
investors and index fund managers to adjust their holdings. The announcement, which takes place 
after the market close, reveals the name of the firm that will be added (deleted) and the exact date 
that the event will take place.
4
 In some instances, however, only the name of the firm and not the 
exact date of the event is announced.  
 
3. Previous literature 
The period during which a change in index composition occurs constitutes a useful laboratory for 
testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). According to the semi-strong form of the EMH, 
the market’s historical knowledge of abnormal returns for index additions (deletions) will drive 
the security’s price up (down) to its expected addition (deletion)-day value on the day after the 
announcement (Cusick, 2002). The profits from buying the stock on the day after the 
announcement and selling it on the effective date should be fully eliminated and the change in the 
security’s price should happen overnight.  
                                                 
3
 In March 2004, Standard and Poor’s announced that it would convert all major U.S. indices to a float-adjusted basis 
and in September 2004, it released details of the methodology used for the free-float calculation. In March 2005, 
S&P500 became half-float adjusted and in September 2005, full-float adjusted. 
4
 We would like to thank Milvia Luckenbach and Srikant Dash from Standard and Poor’s Corporation for providing 
information concerning the new announcement policy. 
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Numerous studies show that the index effect results in stock price behavior during the event 
period that appears inconsistent with the EMH. Consequently, a number of hypotheses have been 
proposed to justify this performance. These are the Price Pressure Hypothesis (see Harris and 
Gurel, 1986; Wooridge and Ghosh, 1986; Malkiel and Radisich, 2001), the Imperfect 
Substitutes/Downward-Sloping Demand Curve for Stocks Hypothesis (Schleifer, 1986; Denis et 
al., 2003), the Liquidity Cost Hypothesis (Mikkelson and Partch, 1985; Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986), the Information Content/Index Member Certification Hypothesis (Jacques, 1988; Dhillon 
and Johnson, 1991), and the Market Segmentation/Investor Recognition Hypothesis (Chen et al., 
2004). Their main differences concern whether the stock price or volume change is temporary or 
permanent after the event, what kind of information is revealed by an addition or deletion, and 
what are the main issues for stock and investor behavior. While the number of papers examining 
whether these hypotheses receive empirical support is large, with the exception of three, all 
consider only close-to-close returns. Such research arguably presents a misleading picture of the 
profitability of trading on changes in index composition since these profits cannot be realized by 
investors.  
 
Beneish and Whaley (1996, 1997) are the first to examine close-to-open returns to measure the 
extent of overnight performance that is consistent with market efficiency using index inclusions 
under both the old and new regimes. The overnight pressure under the old policy was expected to 
be larger since there was no interval between announcement and event. The major part of the 
abnormal close-to-close return of added stocks under the old announcement policy was caused 
overnight (4.37%) and the open-to-close abnormal return of the following day was -0.62% 
leaving no profitable trading opportunities. Under the new announcement policy, however, an 
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abnormal return that is significant but substantially smaller in magnitude occurs overnight 
(2.46%) with an insignificant (positive) open-to-close return the next day (0.6%). 
 
Open-to-close returns are also examined by Cusick (2002), who finds evidence of an increase in 
market efficiency through time, and a decrease in the trading profit available to arbitrageurs who 
buy additions and sell deletions. By using the size of the overnight abnormal return from the 
close on the announcement date until the following morning as a proxy for investors’ interest, he 
shows that the potential trading profits available have decreased over time. His main conclusion 
is that investors’ interest will outweigh the increase in indexing and the available trading profit 
will diminish through time. 
 
No previous studies on the S&P500 index effect employ tick-by-tick data. The methodology used 
in this work to obtain intra-day abnormal returns is similar to that of Wood, McInish and Ord 
(1985), who examine the return characteristics of trades at the micro level, although not relating 
specifically to the index effect. In the case of S&P500 inclusions, new information is released 
overnight and increased trading volume is expected at the beginning of the day after 
announcement. According to Easley and O’Hara (1992), bid-ask spreads should widen upon the 
occurrence of large block transactions to reflect the uncertainty of the future price equilibrium 
and therefore, high standard deviations of intraday returns should also be expected. However, 
inclusions are events that require significant index fund rebalancing, and specialists as well as 
market makers can afford to tighten their spreads in the short run due to increased volumes 
(Beneish and Whaley, 1996). In any case, the U-shaped pattern of return variation may not be 
pronounced since significant trading activity is likely to occur throughout the whole trading day 
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and the evidence of increased liquidity found in previous studies (Edmister, Graham and Pirie, 
1996 and Erwin and Miller, 1998) will not adversely affect trading costs. 
 
4. The overnight and open-to-close effect 
4.1. Data and methodology 
Stock opening and closing prices are obtained from Thomson Datastream. There are insufficient 
data for the benchmark opening prices before the year 1993 and therefore, firms that were added 
to the S&P500 before that year are not examined; the final sample contains 266 stock additions to 
the S&P500 for the period 1993-2002. Of these stocks, 188 are traded on the NYSE and 78 on 
the NASDAQ. The abnormal open-to-close return (OTC) for each firm is obtained by subtracting 
the benchmark return from the open-to-close performance of the stock. The same approach is 
repeated for calculating close-to-close abnormal returns (CTC) from the announcement day (AD) 
close until AD+1 close. The overnight performance is then derived by subtracting the open-to-
close performance from the close-to-close performance: 
 =  it it mtCTC CTC  CTCAR R - R     (1)   
 = it it mtOTC OTC OTCAR R - R     (2)  
it it itCTC OTCOVR = AR - AR     (3) 
where, in the case of the first day after the S&P press release, RCTCit and RCTCmt are the close-to-
close returns between AD and AD+1 for the stock and the S&P500 respectively, ROTCit and 
ROTCmt are the open-to-close returns between AD+1 open and AD+1 close for the stock and the 
benchmark respectively, ARCTCit, AROTCit are the abnormal close-to-close and open-to-close 
returns for each stock respectively, and OVRit is the overnight (non-tradable) abnormal return 
between AD close and AD+1 open for each firm. This method is repeated for the key days during 
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the event window until the day after the effective index change (ED+1). Returns are constructed 
in their continuously compounded form (i.e. log price relatives) throughout this study.  
 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. The whole sample 
Table 1 presents the close-to-close, open-to-close and overnight data between announcement date 
and effective date with their corresponding t-statistics. On the day of announcement (AD), the 
open-to-close return is insignificant, indicating no pre-emptive trading of the future index change. 
Moreover, despite the 4.06% abnormal return from the close of trading on AD to the close on 
AD+1, it is clear that there are no trading opportunities on AD+1 because the open to close return 
is significantly negative at the 1% level (-0.83%). The overnight performance averages 4.89% on 
AD+1 (significantly different from zero at the 1% level), indicating that market makers have very 
positive expectations concerning added firms. The overnight performance is also positive and 
significant every day up to and including AD+5 (except for AD+2 where it is positive but not 
significant) as well as on ED; thereafter, the returns on ED+1 and ED+2 both represent 
statistically significant reversals.  
 
Table 2 repeats the above analysis but the sample is now divided into two different sub-periods, 
for the years 1993-1997 and 1998-2002. Additions to and deletions from the S&P500 have 
become more frequent over the more recent period, and therefore the sample of firms added to 
the index during the latter period is larger (88 firms in the earlier sub-period and 178 firms in the 
later one). The firms added during the first sub-period experience an overnight price increase of 
3.89% after the close on AD and a further marginal and insignificant price increase of 0.02% 
between AD+1 open and AD+1 close. By contrast, in the more recent sub-period, the overnight 
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return between AD close and AD+1 open is 5.38%, with a highly significant negative return of    
-1.25% from the open until the close the day after (AD+1).  
 
The evening of the ED is the last point where the S&P500 has its old composition, and index 
fund managers will have already started rebalancing their portfolios (the new composition and 
divisor adjustment of the S&P500 index are based on ED closing prices). The close-to-close 
abnormal return between ED-1 and ED is significantly different from zero when considering the 
whole sample or either sub-period. However, the ED open-to-close return remains insignificantly 
different from zero for the recent period sub-sample, showing that index fund demand does not 
appear to drive price patterns. It is also worth noting that in the more recent sub-period, the AD+1 
close-to-close price increase is higher, although the ED close-to-close price increase is lower. In 
other words, the abnormal return premium has shifted towards the announcement date. This can 
be attributed to a potential increase in the number of arbitrageurs through time (since the “S&P 
Game” has become more widely known and the number and financial power of hedge funds has 
grown enormously) who may be trying to make a profit by buying the stock ahead of index 
funds. It could be also attributed to an increase in market efficiency,
5
 where participants are 
aware of the positive addition effect and thus drive prices up immediately after the announcement 
date instead of on the event date. 
 
To conclude, according to the above findings, even if the AD+1 close-to-close abnormal return is 
eliminated, there are still some profitable trading opportunities beyond AD+1 until the date of the 
                                                 
5
The t-statistic for the difference across the two sub-samples in the overnight performance between AD close and 
AD+1 open is statistically significant and higher for the recent sub-sample. 
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actual event. The results thus far are consistent with those of Beneish and Whaley (1996 and 
2002) and Cusick (2002). 
 
4.2.2. The overnight effect: NASDAQ listed versus NYSE listed stocks  
The NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges are very different in the way that they operate. The former 
is a specialist market, where all trades occur in a physical place (the NYSE trading floor), 
whereas the latter is a dealer market that is based on a telecommunications network. Christie and 
Schultz (1994), and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) have shown the prevalence of the NYSE 
as a more efficient and less costly exchange. The exchanges also differ in the types of the 
securities that are traded. Stocks listed on the NYSE exchange are typically “blue chips” - i.e., 
established companies, whereas stocks listed on the NASDAQ are usually considered to possess 
significant growth opportunities but with higher levels of risk.  
 
An important advantage of the NYSE is that the market is centralized and the specialist can more 
easily handle any liquidity problems. On the other hand, the NASDAQ exchange is relatively 
decentralized and has greater market depth due to the increased competition among dealers and to 
the direct trading that takes place between market participants in the event of demand or supply 
shocks. LaPlante and Muscarella (1997) showed that the NYSE provides greater liquidity to the 
market than the NASDAQ in the case of large block trades. Chung et al. (2008) also suggest that 
specialists make faster quote adjustments towards equilibrium spreads on the NYSE than they do 
on the NASDAQ. Inferences about the differences between the two exchanges can be more 
accurately made when comparing open-to-close data, where actual trading is taking place, rather 
than the close-to-close data used in previous studies.  
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Table 3 presents the average daily performance of NASDAQ and NYSE listed stocks separately. 
Even if on a close-to-close basis, the exchanges seem to produce different average abnormal 
stock returns on the first trading day after the announcement, and most of the difference occurs 
overnight. In particular, the level of overnight abnormal return for the NASDAQ sample between 
AD close and AD+1 open is 6.65% on average, relative to 4.20% for the NYSE sample. This 
difference is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 4.63). It would thus appear that investors 
perceive a NASDAQ stock inclusion to be more positive news than the addition of a NYSE 
stock. The exchange effect is confirmed by the open-to-close data, showing an advantage of the 
specialist market. This result echoes that of Elliott and Warr (2003), who use daily data to 
investigate differences in the index effect across the two markets. NYSE stocks experience a 
positive open-to-close abnormal return of only 0.48% relative to a figure of 1.05% for NASDAQ 
stocks on the event day. This discrepancy could arise from differential levels of transaction costs 
as well as differing levels of liquidity of NASDAQ versus NYSE added stocks.
6
 The overnight 
abnormal return between ED close and ED+1 open is significantly negative for both NASDAQ 
and NYSE stocks (-1.15% and -0.4% respectively) and statistically different for the two samples 
(t-statistic = 2.69, with the NASDAQ sub-sample realising a larger price reversal).  
 
5. The tick-by-tick performance of the stocks that are added to the S&P500 index 
5.1. Data and methodology: The trade and quote (TAQ) database  
The TAQ database contains intraday transactions data for all securities listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NASDAQ National Market System (NMS) as well as the American 
                                                 
6
 In fact, spreads on NASDAQ stocks are comparable with those of NYSE stocks for most of the trading day, 
averaging 7-10bps (basis points), but NYSE spreads widen considerably to over 100 basis points at the close, while 
those of the NASDAQ remain at around 10bps. The issue of transactions costs will be discussed in detail in Section 
VI.  
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Stock Exchange (AMEX). This analysis uses the reported trades on each day within the event 
window for firms added to or deleted from the S&P500, but tick-by-tick data are only employed 
for the years 1999 and 2000. The final sample consists of 91 added firms (with deletions 
discussed in Section 7). In estimating tick-by-tick abnormal returns, the S&P500 index cannot be 
used directly as a benchmark because intraday index changes are significantly less frequent than 
the intraday changes of the added stocks. The closest substitute for the S&P500 index that is 
traded as a stock and is also very liquid is the “SPIDER” (SPY) fund.7 All the trades recorded on 
each day are collected from the TAQ Database for the sample of firms and for the SPY. 
 
Each firm that was added to the index differs from others in the sample in terms of liquidity and 
the number of trades recorded. To allow for this, we adopt a reference time in seconds from 09.30 
to 16.00. The recorded trades (one series for the prices and one series for the number of shares) 
for each firm are then allocated according to their reported times.
8
 The interval selected for 
analysis is five minutes and therefore, the intraday price and volume performance between 09.30 
and 16.00 for each stock has 78 observations per day. In order to compress the reference time in 
seconds into five-minute intervals, in the case of firms with more than one reported trade per five 
minutes, the sum of the reported quantities of shares over that interval is used as the number of 
shares traded, and the last reported price is used as the price over that interval.
 9
 In the case where 
the firm has not reported any trades over a five-minute interval, the sum of the number of shares 
                                                 
7
 The SPDR (SPY) fund is an ETF (Exchange Traded Fund) that holds all the components of the S&P500 index. 
8
 The more liquid firms cover every second during the reference time and in some cases, there is more than one trade 
per second which occurred at the same price. To overcome this, for those particular seconds, the total number of 
shares traded at the same price is reported as one trade. On the other hand, the less liquid firms have failed to report a 
trade for some seconds of the day and there are gaps in the reference time. However, this is not a problem, since the 
final chosen time interval is longer than a single second and consequently, all firms report at least one trade per time 
interval. 
9
 In the same way, stock markets record the last price as the closing price of the day and not the weighted average 
price of the trades throughout the whole day.  
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traded in that interval is zero and the price for that interval is the same as that of the previous one. 
The same approach is employed to obtain tick-by-tick prices of the SPIDER (SPY) index fund. 
Logarithmic returns are then obtained for each stock and for the SPY by taking the differences of 
the log prices over five-minute intervals, consistent with the method of Wood, McInish and Ord 
(1985). Abnormal returns are then derived by taking the difference between the stock return and 
the benchmark return for all 78 observations each day: 
i, j i, j SPY, jAR  = R  - R     (4) 
where Ri  and RSPY are the interval returns during the trading hours for each stock i and for the 
SPY respectively and ARi,j is the abnormal stock return for each interval j. 
 
In order to measure the intraday trading volume during each day within the event window, the 
number of shares traded per five-minute interval is expressed as a percentage of the total shares 
traded each day for each firm to allow a comparison among firms of different liquidities. These 
percentages are then averaged across firms for each interval and are free of any bias that might 
have occurred due to the differences in the total absolute trading volumes of the stocks. This 
approach may reveal the timing of index fund rebalancing.  
 
5.2. Results 
5.2.1. Intraday firm performance on the announcement date (AD) 
Figure 1 presents the cumulative abnormal performance (lines in the graph) and trading volume 
(bars in the graph) of the average added stock at 5-minute intervals on the date of announcement 
(AD). It can be seen that the overall open-to-close return for the sample of 91 firms is not more 
that 0.3%. On the morning of the announcement date, there is no information revealed to the 
market about the forthcoming S&P500 index change, and thus price and volume behavior should 
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not be driven by this event. Indeed, there is no particular trend in the average tick-by-tick 
performance of the stocks, and prices may be driven only by the corresponding market tick-by-
tick trend.  
 
To check whether there is any anticipation of the S&P press release (that will be posted after the 
close of trading), we also show the volumes over the trading day in Figure 1. For a typical trading 
day, a higher volume is expected over the first few minutes after the market opening as well as 
over the last few minutes before the market close and usually, intraday volumes trace out a “smile 
pattern” (Wood, McInish and Ord, 1985). The average volume observed over the last five 
minutes of the AD, expressed as a percentage of the total daily volume, is high relative to the rest 
of the day. Investors who were actually capable of buying the added stock before the AD close 
due to this potential leakage could enjoy a highly significant abnormal return until the next day’s 
close. Those who did not buy the stock by AD close will have to suffer the huge overnight price 
increase and buy the next day (AD+1) at a higher price.  
 
5.2.2. Intraday firm performance on the first day after announcement (AD+1) 
Since the average stock price reverses during the day (see Table 1), it is worth checking whether 
there is an optimal time to buy the stock, i.e. when the lowest price level occurs on average. 
Figure 2 presents the tick-by-tick cumulative performance and trading volume of the average 
added stock on the first day after announcement. It can be seen that the price experiences a 
continuous negative trend, losing part of the overnight price increase. Under the assumption that 
arbitrageurs and other market participants have realized that the price drops monotonically during 
AD+1, they should wait and buy the stock at the market close. However, according to the volume 
levels presented in Figure 2, it is evident that high trading activity occurs at the opening price. 
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This is reasonable given the overnight price change of almost 5% (reported in Section 4), an 
increase which is statistically significant and therefore, market participants may assume a reversal 
within the day and start selling the stock short at the opening.  
 
Figure 2 also shows how the total daily volume is allocated to the five-minute intervals between 
09.30 and 16.00 on AD+1. Indeed, there is selling pressure at the market open and during the first 
half hour, because volume figures are at their highest levels relative to total daily trading, and the 
price decreases. The stock price of the firm that will soon be added to the index seems to partially 
lose its significant overnight increase during the first day after the revision announcement. In 
Section 4, it was shown that the overall open-to-close return for that day is significant. The buy 
side of these trades may be provided by participants who aim to hold the added stock over the 
long run. The best time to buy the stock is a few minutes before the close, when the price is at its 
lowest level. However, since the stock opens at a considerably higher level than that of the 
previous close, one could enhance the tradable return by short selling the stock at the open on 
AD+1, then buying it back again at the close of trading when it hits its lowest level, and finally 
taking a long position in the stock until the event date (ED).   
 
To complete the AD+1 intraday analysis, we examine firms listed on the NASDAQ and NYSE 
exchanges separately. On the first day after announcement, the cumulative abnormal intraday 
performance of NASDAQ listed stocks is slightly worse than that of the NYSE listed stocks. The 
pattern observed is, however, the same (Figure 3), and there is no obvious exchange effect. This 
difference, especially towards the close of the trading day, may be attributed to the fact that 
NASDAQ listed stocks have stronger overnight performances than stocks listed on the NYSE (as 
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reported in Section 4), and therefore the AD+1 price reversal is more for the former than the 
latter. 
 
5.2.3. Intraday firm performance on the event date (ED) 
The date where the change in the S&P500 re-composition becomes effective is the most 
important one in terms of index fund rebalancing. The change takes place after the close of 
trading on ED and therefore, index fund managers have to complete their purchases as close to 
the stock’s closing price as possible if they wish to minimize their tracking errors. If they 
postpone part of their investment in the added stock until next day’s morning, then they bear the 
risk of realizing a substantial tracking error, since the overnight price change may be 
considerable.  
 
Figure 4 presents the tick-by-tick performance and trading volume of the average added stock on 
the event date (ED) until 18:30. The graph shows that the stock price falls during the day until 
around lunchtime, but closes at a positive level. There is no apparent buying pressure until 12.00, 
but after that time, the price has a positive trend until the close, and becomes volatile over the last 
hour. The stock price reaches its highest level (which is marginally up) at the market close. There 
are two possible explanations for this result. The first is that index funds might have started their 
purchases earlier by choosing to potentially enhance their portfolio returns at the possible 
expense of tracking error. The second explanation is that the market is no longer adding value to 
the stock, since it rallied from the date of announcement until the event and hence, the open-to-
close return on the ED is close to zero. Index fund managers can now buy from arbitrageurs 
without upwardly affecting the price. 
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The trading volume on that date is also of great interest. Figure 4 confirms that index funds are 
completing their purchases a few minutes before and after the close. The volume reported over 
the first five minutes after the close, expressed as a percentage of the total volume for that day, is 
almost 20%. It is worth noting that the volume figures are very smooth throughout the day and 
that trading at the market opening is no heavier than usual. Volume figures become significantly 
high only for the last two intervals before the close and the first two after. Taking into account 
that overall trading volume is 16 times higher than that of a typical day, the numbers become 
even more extreme. There is strong evidence that most index funds are waiting to buy the added 
stock as close to 16.00 as possible, and hence that they are most concerned with tracking error. 
 
When we separate the sample appropriately, we find that the NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples 
behave differently. As expected, the NASDAQ stocks’ prices are driven up by more than 1.5% 
on an open-to-close basis, while NYSE firms close down 1%. The performance of the NYSE 
firms is not even affected by the increased volume during the last ten minutes and the average 
return remains at negative levels (relative to the market opening) throughout the event day 
(Figure 5). The tick-by-tick analysis therefore confirms that from an arbitrageur’s perspective, 
NASDAQ stocks might be more profitable.  
 
The event date is the last profitable day for long non-index trackers who are trading the added 
stocks, since the close-to-close returns reported after that day are significantly negative. Not only 
is the price pressure exhausted by the event date, but there are three consecutive and significant 
close-to-close price reversals on ED+1, ED+2 and ED+3. These reversals can be exploited by 
selling the stock short, a strategy that will be explained in detail in the following section. 
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5.2.4. Intraday firm performance after the event (ED+1, ED+2, and ED+3) 
On the first day after the event, the average added firm experiences a continuous price drop. The 
volumes at the beginning of the day are high, perhaps indicating that index fund rebalancing may 
still be occurring or that arbitrageurs are continuing to unwind their positions. However, the price 
does not seem to be positively affected by index fund demand. Figure 6 presents the cumulative 
intraday firm performance on the first day after the event, in conjunction with the volumes that 
occurred at each interval. Over the first ten minutes of the trading day, almost 9% of the total 
trading occurs. The exchange effect, on the other hand, appears irrelevant on that date and hence 
the analysis is not presented here. 
 
The close-to-close abnormal return remains significant and marginally negative on ED+2 and 
ED+3, as can be seen from Table 1. The added stocks behave differently across the NYSE and 
NASDAQ samples. However, this difference does not allow us to infer firm conclusions about 
further index fund trading behavior and hence it is not reported.
10
 In addition, beyond ED+3, the 
performance of the stock depends mostly on the corresponding overall market performance and 
the price patterns start to look similar to those reported in Figure 1 where AD is examined.  
 
6. An analysis of the intra-day index effect 
This section will determine the profits that are available from trading the added stocks, using the 
266 firms added to the S&P500 index over the years 1993-2002, and taking into account close-to-
close, open-to-close, overnight and abnormal returns. Table 4 presents a summary of the gross 
and net profits that can be made during S&P500 index addition events based on the abnormal 
                                                 
10
 Results for the tick-by-tick stock price and volume performance for the second and third day after the event, as 
well as other analysis described but not presented, are available from the authors upon request. 
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return levels that were found in Section 4. The timing of buying and selling stocks will be based 
on the high frequency analysis presented in Section 5. The strategy involves three basic steps: 
First, being short the added stock from the open of the first day after the announcement until the 
close, since the tick by tick results showed that the lowest price level was at the market close. 
Second, the reversal of the position until the close of the event date and third, being short the 
stock again from the close of the event date until the close of the third day after the event. Our 
approach to testing the profitability of trading index additions is similar in spirit to, but slightly 
more complex than, that employed by Beneish and Whaley (1997) and Cusick (2002). By 
calculating the abnormal returns of newly included stocks over the event period, we obtain a 
percentage profit identical to that which would follow from buying the stock and simultaneously 
short selling the index (through futures or exchange traded funds). In our case, the strategy also 
involves buying the index and short selling the stock at the appropriate points during the event 
window.  
 
The net figures presented in Table 4 allow for transactions costs. In general, S&P500 stocks are 
very liquid, and in particular, during S&P500 rebalancing periods where a great deal of index 
fund trading occurs, spreads become even tighter as liquidity spikes on those days (Edmister, 
Graham and Pirie, 1996). The findings of Erwin and Miller (1998) also suggest a significant 
decrease in both relative and absolute bid-ask spreads. Beneish and Whaley (1996) argue that this 
decrease should be expected since the specialist will be comfortable in reducing the spread given 
that trading volumes during the event are very high, and also, index funds will act to reduce 
spreads as they are likely to place limit orders. 
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Our strategy involves transactions at the open and the close of the market, but the quotes reported 
in the TAQ database for these times differ significantly from those reported throughout the 
remainder of the day. For example, the bid ask spread as a percentage of the mid-price is 45bps 
on average if calculated at the close, and only 12bps if calculated during the day.
11
 Our strategy 
involves 3 round-trip transactions (sell + buy, buy + sell, sell + buy). The additional costs of short 
selling will vary from one stock to another, although they can be as low as 20-40bps per year.
12
  
 
The trading costs in Table 4 are calculated individually for each firm based on the bid-ask 
spreads for the stocks at the times the proposed trades would have taken place and on the costs of 
the off-setting positions in the SPIDER at that time, and these costs are then subtracted from the 
gross returns for each firm to obtain net returns. These net returns are then averaged across the 
stocks to form an overall net profitability for the strategy. The mean difference test reported 
assesses whether the average net returns are significantly different from zero after allowing for 
transactions costs calculated in this way.  
 
From Table 4, it can be seen that the first part of the tradable abnormal return is -0.31% after 
transactions costs, which is just significant at the 10% level.
13
 The cumulative abnormal return 
                                                 
11
 The fall in bid-ask spreads through the day from the market open is related to the clustering of prices at round 
numbers towards the start of the day – see Ohta (2006).  
12
 We do not have data on the separate costs of short selling for each firm over our sample period and so, following 
many other studies such as that by Li et al. (2008), these costs are not considered. Hence the proposed trading 
strategy and the profits it is able to generate will be limited to some extent by short sale costs and constraints. 
13
 The number of days between announcement and event varies among the added firms, averaging 5.06 days. We 
now describe how the cumulative abnormal return between AD+1 and ED is calculated, since there are two possible 
methods. The first is to calculate the cumulative return and divide it by the number of days in the interval from 
AD+1 to ED, to obtain the average rest-of-the-window daily abnormal return for each stock. Then this average daily 
abnormal return should be multiplied by the average interval length of 4.06 days (because AD+1 is not included). 
The sum of all these returns divided by the number of additions will give the final estimate of the average cumulative 
abnormal return. The second and simpler way to calculate an average return is to take the sum of the cumulative 
realised returns for each firm from AD+1 close to ED close and divide it by the number of firms. This method does 
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from AD+1 close to ED close that constitutes the second part of the strategy is 3.13% net and is 
highly significant. Finally, a short position in the stock from ED close until ED+3 close will 
result in another highly significant net profit of 1.66%. The total tradable net profit is 5.1% on 
average. Our abnormal return (gross trading profit) is slightly larger than that reported by Beneish 
and Whaley (1997) of 5.45% because we allow for short selling of the stock at some points 
during the event window, whereas they assume that a long stock – short index strategy prevails 
throughout.
14,15
 It is also worth mentioning that the negative intraday return of AD+1 represents 
the price correction after the large overnight performance from AD close to AD+1 open. The 
positive overnight return (non-tradable) between AD close and AD+1 open tended to increase 
through time, as did the price reversal on the next day (AD+1 open-to-close). Therefore, the 
profits captured from selling the stock at the AD+1 opening and buying it back at the AD+1 close 
would also have increased through time. 
 
7. The intra-day index effect for deleted stocks 
There are relatively few studies regarding the stocks deleted from the S&P500 index because of 
the difficulty in constructing a pure sample which is unbiased with respect to other events. For 
example, if a firm is about to declare bankruptcy, it will eventually need to be deleted from the 
index, but its performance thereafter will be affected by two factors – a deletion effect and a 
bankruptcy effect. The same applies to takeovers and mergers which are similar firm-specific 
                                                                                                                                                              
not account for the differences in the interval lengths. However, when both methods are employed, the results are not 
significantly different and therefore, only the results from the simpler (second) method are reported. 
14
 Their sample periods are 1989-1995 and 1989-1999 respectively compared with the period 1993-2002 used in this 
study, and this difference may also partially explain the variation in results.  
15
 The “up tick” short selling rule that formerly applied to US securities was abolished in July 2007 although it 
applied during our sample period.  
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events.
16
 Studies that examine the impact of deletions are small both in number and in sample 
size investigated: Goetzman and Garry (1986), 7 deletions; Harris and Gurel (1986), 13 deletions; 
and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997), 15 deletions. The broad consensus of this literature is that the 
index effect is even more pronounced and more permanent for deletions than additions. This 
study now repeats the above analysis to investigate the intra-day price and volume effects around 
S&P500 index composition changes on a sample of 19 “pure” deletions (not resulting from 
mergers, takeovers or bankruptcy) during the years 1999-2000.  
 
The close to close abnormal return of the average deleted stock on the first day after 
announcement is -7.43% (Table 5) on a close-to-close basis, although almost all of this occurs 
overnight. As the table shows, significant returns take place on AD+1 and ED. On day ED+2, 
there is a price reversal of 2.02% (on a close to close basis), which is marginally significant. We 
now present the intraday performance of the deletions sample on the key days in the event 
window. To obtain our tick by tick results, we use the same methodology as for the additions 
sample. Due to the limited number of firms, results for days following AD+2 but before the 
effective date will not be presented. We focus mainly on the AD, which may reveal whether there 
is any evidence of anticipation of the announcement, AD+1, where information is first released to 
the market, ED, where index funds should act to match the closing price of the deleted stock at 
16.00, and ED+1, where the S&P500 is first trading under its new composition.  
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 See Dutta and Jog (2009) and the references therein for a very recent discussion of the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions on stock prices.  
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7.1. Intraday price and volume performance on the announcement date 
On the announcement date, the average deleted stock experiences a negative intraday return of     
-1.69%. There is no clear evidence of anticipation of the event. The volume figures are smile-
shaped, indicating no intensive trading at any point during the day apart from at the opening and 
the close, a pattern which is common during a typical trading day for any stock.
17
  
 
7.2. Intraday price and volume performance on AD+1 
The stocks experience an average intraday (open to close) return of -0.44%, which is much 
smaller in magnitude than the overnight price change of -6.99% and gives a total close to close 
return of -7.43%. Interestingly, almost all of the price fall during the trading day occurs with the 
first hour. Trading volumes are quite high during the first half an hour and then they stabilise for 
the rest of the day.  
 
7.3. Intraday price and volume performance on the effective date (ED) and on ED+1 
The most important result is the performance on the event date, at the close of which the S&P500 
changes composition. As Figure 7 shows, the stock price is volatile until the early afternoon when 
it trends downwards. By the close, the price has fallen by 3.93% on average. As for the additions 
sample, the volume figures confirm that index funds wait until the close to sell the deleted stock. 
They appear unwilling to sell at an earlier stage, even if the price continues to fall. The maximum 
volume occurs around 16.00, and this interval represents 35% of the total daily volume. In this 
figure, we also report volume until 18.30, which indicates evidence of significant after market 
hours trading or late reporting; nothing like this degree of after hours trading occurs on any other 
day during the event period. 
                                                 
17
 The results for this date are not shown but are available from the authors on request.  
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During the first day where the S&P actually trades in its new composition (ED+1), volumes for 
the newly deleted stocks return to their normal U-shapes, apart from increased trading by around 
10% of the daily volume during the first 10 minutes. This could potentially relate to further index 
fund rebalancing that was not completed at the previous day’s close. The average cumulative 
abnormal return rebounds, albeit very modestly (+0.05% over the whole day).
18
  
 
8. Conclusions 
The first part of this study disaggregates close-to-close abnormal returns into overnight and open-
to-close abnormal returns, showing that the close-to-close positive effect observed one day after 
the announcement of addition cannot be traded. However, profitable trading opportunities occur 
between the first day after announcement and the date of the actual event. The overnight price 
change seems to have increased over time, indicating an improvement in the level of market 
efficiency and a decrease in the profits available to arbitrageurs. In addition, the event date 
abnormal return caused mainly by index fund rebalancing has diminished over time, because 
most of the positive effect of being added to the S&P500 index is reflected in the stock price in 
advance of the actual event. 
 
The second part of this study examines the tick-by-tick performance of the firms that were added 
to the S&P500 index over the years 1999-2000. To summarize the main findings of this analysis, 
the intraday stock price movements on AD appear to be random because information about the 
future index change has not been released to the market at that time. However, a relatively high 
volume is observed over the last five minutes of this trading day, indicating a potential leakage of 
information before the S&P press release. During the trading hours of the first day after 
                                                 
18
 The results for this date are not shown but are available from the authors on request. 
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announcement (AD+1), the stock experiences a price drop without reversing at all, a behavior 
perhaps best explained by an overshoot in the overnight price increase that occurred between AD 
close and AD+1 open.  
 
It is also worth noting the huge trading volume that occurs over the last ten minutes on the event 
date, which constitutes the last possible opportunity for index fund managers to rebalance their 
portfolios before the change becomes effective. This abnormal volume level provides evidence 
that most index funds seek to rebalance their portfolios as close to 16.00 as possible, and that they 
are concerned with tracking error. This finding is in contrast to the parting conjecture of Beneish 
and Whaley (1997), who suggest that index funds are rebalancing increasingly early after the 
announcement as they become more mindful of the price impacts of arbitrageurs. However, this 
increase in volume is not accompanied by a price increase, perhaps showing that other market 
participants, especially arbitrageurs, are unwinding their long positions in the added stock. 
Therefore, there is enough supply to satisfy index fund demand. After the event date, there is no 
further price pressure and the stock price drops significantly on both an open-to-close and an 
overnight basis.  
 
This study also examines a sample of pure deletions using intra-day data, with the key findings 
mirroring those of the additions. While there is a fall in the price of to-be-deleted stocks 
following the announcement, most of this occurs overnight between AD and AD+1 and hence is 
not tradable. There is a further large price fall on the effective day, with most of the day’s trading 
volume happening around the close.  
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From the tick-by-tick analysis, the optimal strategy for trading the added stock is to sell it short 
on AD+1 at the market open and to buy it back at the close. At the same time, a further long 
position in the stock should be taken at AD+1 close until the close of ED. Finally, a further short 
position should be taken in the stock between ED close and ED+3 close. The profits from these 
trades are all statistically significant and total almost 7% in gross terms and over 5% after 
transactions costs. Numerous researchers have documented, based on daily price series, a 
perceived reduction over time in the index effect as an increased number of investors try to take 
advantage of it.
19
 We argue that this masks the profits that are available to arbitrageurs who are 
willing to trade on an intra-daily basis. While index funds persist in favoring accurate tracking 
over profitability, arbitrageurs will continue to benefit.  
 
                                                 
19
 Ding et al. (2009) show that the flow of capital into hedge funds has depressed absolute returns, as an increasing 
amount of money has chased a limited number of arbitrage opportunities. 
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Table 1: Close-to-close, open-to-close and overnight average daily firm performance between AD and ED+3, 1993-2002 
Days AD AD+1 AD+2 AD+3 AD+4 AD+5 ED ED+1 ED+2 ED+3 
Close-to-close 
AR 0.40% 4.06% 0.33% 0.60% 0.60% 0.59% 2.18% -0.96% -0.52% -0.78% 
t-stat 1.67 16.30 1.66 2.48 2.36 1.41 6.57 -4.05 -2.64 -3.62 
Open-to-Close 
AR 0.12% -0.83% 0.19% 0.20% 0.22% 0.00% 0.64% -0.36% -0.32% -0.62% 
t-stat 0.68 -4.50 1.05 0.92 0.91 0.01 2.39 -1.96 -1.78 -3.22 
Overnight 
AR 0.28% 4.89% 0.14% 0.40% 0.38% 0.59% 1.54% -0.60% -0.20% -0.16% 
t-stat 1.98 19.69 1.30 2.56 3.42 2.98 7.79 -4.70 -2.59 -1.47 
 
 
Notes: Figures in bold denote statistics that are significant at the 5% level or better.  
 
 
Table 2: Close-to-close, open-to-close and overnight average daily firm performance between AD and ED+1 over two 
different sub-periods 
Panel A: 1993-1997 
Days AD AD+1 AD+2 AD+3 AD+4 AD+5 ED ED+1 
Close-to-close 
AR -0.05% 3.91% 0.41% 0.03% 0.27% 0.60% 3.10% -0.79% 
t-stat -0.21 10.74 1.75 0.11 1.18 1.36 6.51 -3.45 
Open-to-Close 
AR 0.02% 0.02% 0.16% 0.10% 0.11% 0.38% 1.49% -0.37% 
t-stat 0.09 0.07 0.71 0.40 0.42 1.06 4.40 -1.74 
Overnight 
AR -0.07% 3.89% 0.25% -0.07% 0.16% 0.22% 1.61% -0.42% 
t-stat -0.81 12.58 2.21 -0.79 0.79 0.74 4.13 -3.67 
Panel B: 1998-2002 
Days AD AD+1 AD+2 AD+3 AD+4 AD+5 ED ED+1 
Close-to-close 
AR 0.62% 4.13% 0.28% 0.89% 0.84% 0.59% 1.73% -1.04% 
t-stat 1.85 12.69 1.05 2.60 2.07 1.02 4.00 -3.11 
Open-to-Close 
AR 0.17% -1.25% 0.20% 0.25% 0.31% -0.17% 0.23% -0.36% 
t-stat 0.71 -5.07 0.82 0.83 0.81 -0.29 0.63 -1.41 
Overnight 
AR 0.45% 5.38% 0.08% 0.64% 0.53% 0.76% 1.50% -0.68% 
t-stat 2.21 16.27 0.57 3.10 3.75 2.98 6.67 -3.77 
Notes: Figures in bold denote statistics that are significant at the 5% level or better.  
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Table 3: Close-to-close, open-to-close and overnight average daily firm performance between AD and ED+1 for NASDAQ 
and NYSE listed stocks, 1993-2002 
Panel A: NASDAQ Stocks 
Days AD AD+1 AD+2 AD+3 AD+4 AD+5 ED ED+1 
Close-to-close 
AR 0.00% 4.70% 0.13% 1.17% 1.94% 1.24% 3.53% -1.48% 
t-stat 0.00 8.47 0.33 1.99 2.88 1.46 4.23 -2.16 
Open-to-Close 
AR -0.28% -1.95% 0.17% -0.09% 1.34% -0.10% 1.05% -0.33% 
t-stat -0.70 -5.28 0.46 -0.16 2.17 -0.10 1.61 -0.70 
Overnight 
AR 0.28% 6.65% -0.04% 1.26% 0.60% 1.34% 2.48% -1.15% 
t-stat 1.45 12.24 -0.16 2.86 2.35 2.99 5.55 -3.16 
Panel B: NYSE Stocks 
Days AD AD+1 AD+2 AD+3 AD+4 AD+5 ED ED+1 
Close-to-close 
AR 0.55% 3.86% 0.42% 0.37% 0.09% 0.22% 1.65% -0.77% 
t-stat 1.97 14.41 1.80 1.41 0.38 0.46 5.11 -4.03 
Open-to-Close 
AR 0.27% -0.34% 0.20% 0.26% -0.21% -0.04% 0.48% -0.37% 
t-stat 1.47 -1.70 0.93 1.19 -0.89 -0.10 1.73 -2.07 
Overnight 
AR 0.28% 4.20% 0.22% 0.11% 0.32% 0.26% 1.17% -0.40% 
t-stat 1.51 16.45 2.23 0.61 2.45 1.34 5.61 -3.98 
Notes: Figures in bold denote statistics that are significant at the 5% level or better.  
 
Table 4: Gross and net profits from trading index inclusions, 1993-2002 
 
 AD+1 open-to-close AD+1 to ED close-to-close ED to ED+3 close-to-close Total  
Gross return -0.83% 3.75% -2.26% 6.84% 
Trading Costs 0.52% 0.62% 0.60% 1.74% 
Net Return -0.31% 3.13% -1.66% 5.10% 
Mean Difference Test (H0: net return = 0) 
t-statistic (p-value) -1.67 (0.0956) 5.93 (0.0000) -3.89 (0.0001) 6.83 (0.0000) 
 
Table 5: Close-to-close, open-to-close and overnight average daily firm performance between AD and ED+3 for deletions 
Days AD AD+1 AD+2 AD+3 AD+4 AD+5 ED ED+1 ED+2 ED+3 
Close-to-close 
AR -2.45% -7.43% -2.10% -0.96% -1.02% 2.01% -3.86% 1.10% 2.02% -1.05% 
t-stat -0.85 -7.23 -1.93 -0.60 -1.68 0.24 -1.96 0.74 1.62 -0.74 
Open-to-Close 
AR -1.69% -0.44% -2.57% -1.57% -1.37% 4.00% -3.93% 0.05% 1.37% -1.43% 
t-stat -0.63 -0.63 -2.24 -1.13 -1.92 0.59 -2.23 0.03 1.26 -1.17 
Overnight 
AR -0.76% -6.99% 0.47% 0.61% 0.35% -1.99% 0.07% 1.05% 0.65% 0.38% 
t-stat -1.02 -6.95 1.19 1.86 1.03 -1.30 0.05 0.98 1.27 0.42 
Notes: Figures in bold denote statistics that are significant at the 5% level or better 
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Figure 1: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance and number of shares traded over each five-minute interval 
expressed as a percentage of the total daily volume of the average added stock on AD 
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Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal performance and number of shares traded over each five-minute interval expressed as a 
percentage of the total daily volume of the average added stock on AD+1 
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Figure 3: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance of the average NASDAQ vs. NYSE added stock on AD+1 
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Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal performance of the average added stock and number of shares traded over each five-minute 
interval expressed as a percentage of the total daily volume on ED 
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Figure 5: Tick-by-tick cumulative abnormal performance of the average NASDAQ vs. NYSE added stock on the ED 
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Figure 6: Tick-by-tick average cumulative firm abnormal performance of the average added stock and number of shares 
traded over each five-minute interval expressed as a percentage of the total daily volume on ED+1 
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Figure 7: Intraday cumulative abnormal return and trading volume at 5-minute intervals for the deletions sample on ED 
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